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Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosures by New Zealand 
Companies 
 
Abstract  
This study examines the motivation for the increased reporting of non-GAAP earnings 
(NGE) by New Zealand companies following the adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). The study contributes to the literature on the impacts of 
IFRS adoption at national levels and the relationship between statutory earnings and 
NGE information disclosed by listed companies.  
 
The annual reports of fifty-eight listed companies are examined for the period from 
2004 to 2012. The number of companies reporting NGE figures has increased 
substantially over this period of time with NGE figures higher and significantly 
different to the audited net profit after tax (NPAT) figures in the post-IFRS period. 
There appears to be some merit in reporting NGE figures as they are better predictors 
of future earnings and contribute value to analysts’ forecasts.  
 
NGE earnings are sometimes higher than NPAT earnings which could suggest that 
earnings are being used to create a more favourable impression of performance.  
However, results indicate that NGE compared to NPAT appear to have a higher quality 
of earnings, conveying additional information to the market.  
 
 
Key words: non-GAAP earnings, IFRS, signalling and manipulation hypothesis 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
This objective of this study is to investigate the motivation behind the increased 
disclosure of alternative earnings by New Zealand listed companies. While the financial 
information required by generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP) is present in the 
financial statements of listed companies, these alternative figures are often the ones 
emphasised in management’s comments in the annual report such as in the Chairperson’s 
Report. 
The recent trend in disclosure of alterative earnings may be due to consequences of the 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Deloitte (2010, 2011) note an 
increase in the reporting of alternative non-GAAP earnings (NGE) figures in the annual 
reports of New Zealand companies following the adoption of IFRS. Similar trends have been 
reported in Australia (KPMG, 2010).  
We examine two competing motivations to explain the disclosure of NGE earnings. 
The first is that management have increased the use of NGE earnings post IFRS adoption as a 
means of communicating information about (or signalling) the impacts of IFRS adoption. 
With the adoption of IFRS it may be that users unaccustomed to it needed more assistance in 
understanding the information during the transition phase.  
An alternative explanation is that managers report opportunistically, using NGE to 
convey a more favourable impression than that reflected in IFRS reported earnings as a way 
of influencing users’ perceptions of managerial performance (manipulation hypothesis). We 
examine whether New Zealand companies are using NGE earnings measures to better explain 
results or to cover bad news (i.e. mask losses).  
Consistent with prior research we use earning quality tests to assess the relative 
informativeness and persistence of NGE earnings disclosed by NZX listed companies in 
comparison to statutory earnings prepared under IFRS. We also provide various descriptive 
details including the common types of NGE adjustments, the characteristics of firms that 
report NGE earnings and the trend in NGE earnings disclosures post IFRS adoption.  
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This paper examines the reporting of NGE over the period encompassing the adoption 
of IFRS in New Zealand.  The population of all companies listed on the NZX in 2011 is used 
to identify those companies reporting NGE earnings.  Data is then collected from published 
annual reports from 2004 to 2012 for those companies reporting NGE earnings to determine 
whether signalling or manipulation better explains the pattern of reporting. Of the total 
population of 106 companies 58 (55 per cent) reported NGE earnings in one or more of the 
nine years.  
Our analysis shows that the most common NGE adjustments are fair value adjustments. 
We find that overall 50 per cent of the NGE figures are higher than the reported NPAT 
figures. The results show that reporting of NGE is associated with the adoption of IFRS and 
does not appear to have significantly abated since.   
The earnings quality tests show that NGE earnings are more informative to investors 
that NPAT earnings and contribute value to analysts’ forecasts.  This suggests a signalling 
motivation. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two main ways. First the study 
provides evidence of the impact of IFRS adoption in New Zealand. Evidence on the impact of 
IFRS adoption is mixed as summarised in review papers by Brown (2011) and Pope and 
McLeay (2011). They consider that the mixed body of evidence is due to national differences 
associated with the implementation and enforcement of IFRS. While it is acknowledged that 
the size of the sample in this study is small and thus the generalisability of the results is 
restricted, from a local policy perspective it is important that research is undertaken in New 
Zealand to evaluate the impacts of IFRS adoption as they may be quite different from other 
jurisdictions. This study then adds to the modest pool of academic papers that have evaluated 
IFRS adoption in New Zealand and extends it by considering how IFRS information is 
communicated to users.  
The paper also adds to the literature on the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings of listed 
companies. Research on testing the signalling and manipulation hypotheses has been 
concentrated on the US capital market and has provided mixed evidence. Comparisons are 
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also able to be made with other similar jurisdictions, such as Australia. The study contributes 
to the literature by providing a case study of NGE disclosures in a small capital market and 
policy implications for regulators.  
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows. Section two provides a literature 
review. Hypotheses are developed in section three, and section four describes the sample and 
research methodology. Descriptive information is provided in section five with the results of 
hypothesis testing summarised and discussed in section six. The final section presents the 
conclusion.  
 
2.0 Literature review 
This review focuses on two strands of literature. The first part considers evidence on 
IFRS adoption. Although the number of empirical studies in this area is vast, the review 
concentrates primarily on IFRS adoption in New Zealand. 
The second part of the literature review focuses on research examining the motivations 
for firms disclosing NGE earnings. 
  
2.1 IFRS Adoption in New Zealand: Evidence and Background  
The adoption of international financial reporting standards is aimed at developing a 
set of globally accepted standards which provide high quality, transparent and comparable 
information to capital markets and other users (IASB, 2002). In 2002 a significant step 
towards achieving this goal occurred with the European Union (EU) adopting IFRS for all EU 
listed companies from 1 January 2005. The aim was for listed companies to have a single set 
of high quality standards that would ensure a ‘high degree of transparency and comparability 
of financial statements’ (European Parliament, 2002: Article 1).  
In 2002, the New Zealand Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB) following 
Australia’s move to adopt IFRS announced that New Zealand listed companies would be 
required to adopt by 1 January 2007 with early adoption permitted from 1 January 2005. The 
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move to IFRS was one of the most significant changes in New Zealand’s financial reporting 
environment for a number of years.  
The impact of IFRS adoption has been the focus of a number of research studies 
considering a range of areas including market reaction to IFRS numbers, the financial impacts 
of IFRS compared with national GAAP, the level of compliance with IFRS standards, the 
impact of IFRS on accounting quality, analysts’ forecasts, cost of capital, and value relevance 
of the IFRS accounting numbers versus national GAAP. 
Reviews of the research by Brown (2011), Brown and Tarca (2012), Pope and Mc 
Leay (2011) and Bruggemann, Hitz and Sellhorn (2012) provide summaries of the results of 
the research to date. The results provide mixed results of the benefits of IFRS adoption. The 
mixed results are due to different research designs but also to variations in how IFRS is 
implemented due to differences in implementation and enforcement at a cross country level.  
The New Zealand experience shows that the financial impact of IFRS adoption was 
generally small for most listed firms. In comparison with old-GAAP, the adoption of IFRS 
resulted in statistically significant increases in assets, liabilities, and net profit but decreases in 
equity. The most common increases in assets resulted from financial instrument adjustments 
and for liability increases from deferred income tax and employee benefit adjustments. These 
changes had a significant impact on financial statement ratios; increasing leverage and returns 
on equity, assets and sales (Stent, Bradbury and Hooks, 2010). Similar financial impacts are 
reported in the public sector with both assets and liabilities increasing. Equity decreased as a 
result of adjustments relating to employee entitlements, financial instruments and deferred 
taxation for commercial firms owned by the government (Trewavas, Botica Redmayne, and 
Laswad, 2012). 
Empirical evidence has also shown no significant improvement in accounting quality 
measured by alternative measures of discretionary accruals (Kabir, Laswad and Islam, 2010) 
and value relevance (Rainsbury and Hart, 2010). In contrast, the introduction of IFRS and the 
capitalisation of intangibles improved analysts’ forecasts (Cheong, Kim and Zurbruegg 2010).  
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The adoption of IFRS increased the size of the financial statements and notes to the 
accounts. Morunga and Bradbury (2013) estimate that, after excluding transitional 
disclosures, the length of annual reports of listed companies increased by 20%; due primarily 
to increases in accounting policies and notes to the accounts. The additional number of pages 
and tables has significantly reduced the readability of annual reports as measured by Flesh, 
Flesh-Kincaid, Smog and Fog readability indicators (Richards and van Staden, 2011). 
Under IFRS reporting, changes in fair values, which may involve judgements and 
estimates, can have a significant impact on earnings. Supporters of fair value accounting 
believe that it increases financial reporting transparency and facilitates better investment 
decision-making (SEC, 2008; Kim and Sung, 2012; Zabel and Morrell, 2009). However, 
measuring fair values can be difficult where markets are volatile, illiquid and when models 
are used to determine fair value which may introduce bias (Hail, 2012; Ma and MacNamara, 
2009).  
IFRS has also been shown to sometimes create misleading results (Beattie, Fearnley 
and Hines, 2008; Pawsey, 2010). For example, in Pawsey’s (2010) survey of Chief Financial 
Officers (CFOs) of Australian listed companies IFRS was considered too complex, time 
consuming, and sometimes produced misleading results. Financial statements were 
considered less relevant and understandable to users with some CFOs predicting that financial 
users would rely on alternative profit measures, such as NGE, or cash flows.  
In the United Kingdom, Beattie et al (2008) surveyed audit committee chairs, finance 
directors and audit partners of listed companies on the quality of financial reporting after the 
adoption of IFRS. There was a general consensus amongst the groups that IFRS adoption had 
undermined the quality of financial reporting integrity. IFRS accounts were “difficult to 
understand even for experts; are complex; have too many disclosures; and are counter-
intuitive in some areas” (Beattie et al, 2008, p.8). 
However, with the adoption of IFRS it is claimed that the disclosure of NGE is 
increasing as IFRS accounting standards do not accurately portray company performance, and 
that NGE figures provide a better insight into a company’s underlying operational 
7 
 
performance (Gaynor, 2010). An Ernst & Young (2006) study on the implementation of IFRS 
noted an increase in the use of NGE figures in press releases and company presentations 
signifying “a gap between IFRS and what managers believe is necessary in order to 
communicate to the markets information which enables underlying performance and 
sustainable cash flow to be assessed” (p.3). However, that trend was considered at the time to 
be short term until IFRS reporting improved and analysts became more familiar with IFRS 
reporting. However, there is some evidence that this is not a transitional matter. For example, 
Wee, Tarca and Chang (2011) examine firm disclosures by 150 Australian companies 
following IFRS adoption and find that those with lower earnings under IFRS make additional 
disclosures, suggesting that preparers make the disclosures to explain adverse results.  
 
2.2 Non-GAAP Earnings (NGE) 
Non-statutory performance measures are reported by companies in audited financial 
statements in press releases and other documents. These non-GAAP measures are variously 
referred to as “proforma earnings”, “underlying profits”, “street earnings”, “normalised 
profits”, “core earnings”, “non-GAAP earnings” or “non-conforming financial information” 
(The Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) 2005; Christensen, Merkley, 
Tucker and Venkataraman, 2010; FMA, 2011). NGE can include measures such as earnings 
before interest and tax (EBIT) or earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation 
(EBITDA). 
For the purposes of this paper, NGE are measures of earnings other than the profit 
measure (NPAT) determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice under 
the requirements of the Financial Reporting Act 1993.  NGE are derived by making 
adjustments to the statutory NPAT figure prepared in accordance with GAAP. The 
adjustments can include non-recurring items such as expenses arising from major business 
reorganisation activities such as restructurings, business unit closures, mergers or acquisitions 
(Entwistle, Feltham and Mbagwu, 2005). The adjustments may also include one–off asset 
impairments and write-offs, gains or losses from asset sales and legal settlements, fair-value 
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adjustments, research and development expenses, stock-based compensation, and tax-related 
items (Christensen et al., 2010). 
 
2.3 Regulatory Background 
Regulators and professional accounting bodies have raised concerns about the use of 
alternative performance measures reported outside the audited financial statements in press 
releases and other documents (McLaughlin, 2010; Financial Markets Authority (FMA), 
2011). Regulators acknowledge that while NGE may provide useful information to users there 
is also the potential to mislead them (FMA, 2011; FMA, 2012). In order to maintain market 
confidence various regulators have introduced requirements, recommendations or guidelines 
for issuers to follow when disclosing non-GAAP earnings.  
In the United States the Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 required the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to address non-GAAP disclosures. SEC Regulation G (SEC, 
2003) requires that, when a non-GAAP measure is disclosed, the issuer must provide the 
directly comparable GAAP measure and a reconciliation of the non-GAAP and GAAP 
financial measures.  
There are currently no regulations in Europe governing non-GAAP earnings but 
recommendations were issued by the Committee of European Securities Regulators1 (CESR) 
in 2005. Issuers making non-GAAP disclosures are recommended to define the components 
of the NGE measure and explain the differences from the GAAP figure. Non-GAAP earnings 
should be disclosed consistently over time along with comparable figures from prior periods 
(CESR, 2005). 
In Australia and New Zealand there are currently no regulations with respect to the 
disclosure of non-GAAP earnings, but both countries have guidelines. Australian listed 
companies are encouraged to follow guidelines issued by the Australian Institute of Company 
Directors and the Financial Services Institute of Australasia (2009). In addition, the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC, 2011) Consultation Paper 150 
                                                     
1 Now reformed as the European Securities and Markets Authority 
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proposes that NGE should not be included in the statutory financial statements and only in the 
notes to the financial statements when it is necessary to give a true and fair view of the 
financial statements. NGE are permitted in other communications such as directors’ reports, 
press releases and analyst briefings but they must not be misleading or be given greater 
prominence than the GAAP financial information. A reconciliation between the non-GAAP 
and GAAP earnings is also required along with explanations of the adjustments. Consistent 
with the European recommendations the measures must be prepared consistently from period 
to period and comparative figures provided.   
In September 2012, New Zealand’s FMA released a guidance note on disclosure of 
non-GAAP financial information for issuers, their directors and preparers of financial 
information. The guidelines set out expectations on the use of financial information in 
corporate documents and are similar to the guidelines in ASIC’s Consultation Paper 150, with 
the additional guideline that the “non-GAAP financial information should be unbiased and 
not used to remove or disguise ‘bad’ news” (FMA, 2012, p. 7). 
 
2.4 Motivations for Reporting non-GAAP earnings  
The first of the two competing reasons advanced for reporting NGEs is the signalling 
hypothesis which suggests that the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings conveys additional 
information of relevance to users of financial statements. A previous study by Bhattacharya, 
Black, Christensen, and Larson (2003) finds that NGE are more informative and persistent 
than GAAP earnings, supporting the view that NGE give a better picture of permanent 
earnings. Brown and Sivakumar (2003) also find that NGE provide more relevant information 
than GAAP measures. Other studies show that firms with less value-relevant earnings, 
specifically technology firms and firms with prior losses (Bowen, Davis and Matsumoto, 
2005) and less informative earnings (Lougee and Marquardt, 2004), are most likely to 
emphasise non-GAAP earnings. These studies suggest that NGE can provide additional 
information to users about firm performance.   
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A second reason suggested for the disclosure of NGE is the manipulation hypothesis - 
that managers operate opportunistically; using NGE to manage investor perceptions. 
Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen and Mergenthaler (2004) find that firms that disclose NGE 
are more likely to be less profitable than other firms, have higher debt, higher liquidity, and 
higher price to earnings, and book to market ratios.  
Non-GAAP reporting appears to increase when firms have share price and earnings 
declines (bad news) and when there are analysts’ predictions to meet (Bhattacharya et al., 
2004). Bowen et al. (2005) show that in press releases firms emphasise the performance 
measure which portrays the better performance of the firm. NGE are disclosed first in press 
releases to emphasise a positive performance when GAAP earnings fall short of strategic 
benchmarks (Marques, 2010).  
Research findings suggest that the opportunistic behaviour of managers has the 
potential to mislead investors. For example, the market does not appear to take into 
consideration expenses excluded from NGE which have a negative impact on future cash 
flows (Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman, 2003). Unsophisticated investors are influenced by 
NGE and are more likely to assess earnings and stock performance as being higher and trade 
on this information while sophisticated investors do not (Fredrickson and Miller 2003; Elliott, 
2006; Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen and Mergenthaler, 2007). 
 
3.0 Research Questions and Hypotheses  
The first research question examines the trend in the disclosure of non-GAAP earnings 
following the adoption of the IFRS reporting regime.   
1. Have the disclosure of NGE measures by New Zealand listed companies increased 
under the IFRS reporting regime?   
Hypothesis 1 reflects this first research question.  
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association between the disclosure of non-GAAP 
earnings and the IFRS reporting regime 
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The second research question tests the signalling hypothesis that managers disclose 
non-GAAP earnings in order to convey information to users. In this case we test if NGE 
earnings have higher earnings quality than statutory NPAT. Two earning quality proxies are 
used: earnings persistence and investors’ responsiveness to earnings.  
The second research question is in two parts:  
2. Do NGE measures disclosed by New Zealand listed companies increase 
earnings quality?  
Specifically: 
2(a) Do NGE measures provide better prediction of future earnings than NPAT 
earnings?  
2(b)  Do NGE measures provide more value relevant information than NPAT 
earnings? 
Hypothesis 2 reflects the research question 2(a).  
Hypothesis 2: NGE measures provide a better prediction of future earnings than 
NPAT earnings 
Hypothesis 3 reflects the research question 2(b).  
Hypothesis 3: NGE measures provide more value relevant information than NPAT 
earnings 
 
4.0 Sample and Research Methodology 
4.1 Sample 
In this study we examine the annual reports of fifty-eight New Zealand listed 
companies for the period 2004 to 2012. The population comprised all companies listed on the 
NZX and excluded those that did not report in all nine years, cross-listed companies, and 
property trusts were excluded. Table 1 summarises the sample selection.2 
 
                                                     
2 Nine companies with a December 31 balance date are not included for the 2012 data as at the time of 
writing these reports had not yet been released. 
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Insert Table 1 
 
The time period covers pre and post IFRS adoption. New Zealand listed companies 
were required to adopt IFRS for financial accounting periods beginning 1 January 2007 with 
early adoption permitted from 1 January 2005. The fifty-eight companies in this study 
adopted IFRS from as early as 2006 to as late as 2008. Seventeen companies reported for the 
first time under IFRS in 2006 (29 per cent), 12 (21 per cent) in 2007 and the remaining 29 (50 
per cent) in 2008.  After 2008 all companies were reporting under IFRS.  
The data, hand collected from annual reports for the period, consisted of the NPAT 
figure in the income statement, adjustments to NPAT and all reported NGE figures. Particular 
attention was given to the income statement and notes referenced from the income statement 
and reports of the Chairperson of the Board of Directors and the Chief Executive Officer.  
 
4.2 Research Method  
The three hypotheses are tested using regression models.  
Hypothesis 1: NGE and reporting under IFRS 
A logistic regression model is used to examine the association between the disclosure 
of NGE and reporting under IFRS, controlled by a number of identified factors. 
The full model is: 
NGE      =  GROWTHLEVMKTBKREPREG 43210   
  INDLOSSSHAREPRICEPROFIT 8765   (1) 
where: 
 
NGE Disclosure of non-GAAP earnings - Binary (Yes (1)/No (0) ) 
REPREG Reporting regime – Binary (IFRS (1) /Prior NZ GAAP (0)) 
MKTBK Market-to-book value of equity 
GROWTH Sales growth – percentage change from prior year 
LEV Leverage (Total liabilities/Total assets) 
PROFIT Percentage change in profit from prior year 
SHAREPRICE Percentage change in year end share price from prior year 
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LOSS Loss-reported in current year – Binary (Yes (1)/No (0)) 
IND Industry indicator variables (Broad industry categorisation) 
 Error term 
 
The dependent variable NGE represents whether or not a company reports non-GAAP 
earnings. It is a binary variable coded 1 if a company reports NGE and zero otherwise. 
The independent variable of interest is the reporting regime (REPREG). This is also a 
binary variable coded 1 if a company is reporting under IFRS and 0 if not. A positive 
coefficient for this variable would indicate that IFRS adoption is associated with reporting of 
NGE.  
The regression equation is controlled by several factors that could impact on the 
disclosure of NGE as highlighted in the research literature.  
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) suggest that high-growth companies are more likely to 
report non-GAAP earnings, although Epping and Wilder (2011) find that low-growth 
companies make more adjustments to GAAP earnings to arrive at NGE. Although different in 
outcome, the evidence from these studies is that growth impacts on disclosure. Similar to 
Lougee and Marquardt (2004) growth is measured using market-to-book (MKTBK) at the 
financial year end reflecting the market anticipating future growth and the percentage change 
in sales growth (GROWTH) over the prior year. 
Leverage (LEV) is positively associated with NGE (Hodgson and Stevenson-Clarke, 
2000; Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Lougee and Marquardt, 2004) because companies with high 
leverage are perceived to have less informative earnings, so those companies are more likely 
to report NGEs.  
Companies are more likely to report NGE if there is volatility in profit, earnings per 
share or share price (Bhattacharya et al., 2004). Control variables are used for the percentage 
change in profit from the prior year (PROFIT) and the percentage change in share price 
(SHAREPRICE). Likewise if companies are showing a loss (LOSS) there is a greater 
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likelihood of use of NGE, particularly if this improves the perceived performance 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Bowen et al., 2005). 
Where companies are operating in fast-changing sectors, such as technology, the 
usefulness of financial reports is less than it is where there is more stability (Lev and Zarowin, 
1999; Bowen et al., 2005). This means that it is important to control for industry type (IND). 
A second variation on the model incorporates a dummy variable for the period 
affected by the global financial crisis (GFC) (2009 – 2011). This is included on the basis that 
this period was likely to have adjustments resulting from the crisis, such as asset impairments, 
which might be excluded from a reported NGE. 
The second model is: 
 
NGE =  GROWTHLEVMKTBKREPREG 43210   
  GFCINDLOSSSHAREPRICEPROFIT 98765
  (2) 
where: 
 
GFC Global financial crisis period (2009-2011) - Binary (Yes (1)/No (0) ) 
 
Hypothesis 2: NGE and Earnings Persistence 
A more persistent earnings number is considered to be of higher quality. The 
underlying theory is that it will be easier to predict the future cash flows of a firm that has 
more persistent or sustainable earnings which will make it easier for forecasting cash flows 
for equity valuation and reduce valuation errors (Dechow, Ge and Shrand, 2010; Penman, 
2007).    
Earnings persistence is measured by the slope coefficient from a regression of future 
earnings (year t+1) on current year earnings (year t) scaled by the number of shares. For 
current year earnings regressions are repeated using NPAT and NGE earnings. The models 
are:   
it
NZGAAP
t
NZGAAP
t NPATNPAT   101  
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itt
NZGAAP
t NGENPAT   101  
Where: 
NZGAAP
ttNPAT /1  = net profit after tax under NZ GAAP at time t+1 and t scaled by the number 
of shares  
ttNGE /1  = non- GAAP earnings at time t+1 and t scaled by the number of shares.  
it = error term  
The coefficient 1 measures persistence with a higher coefficient considered a more 
persistent earnings stream (Dechow, Ge and Shrand, 2010).  
 
Hypothesis 3: NGE and value relevance 
Reported earnings provide information relevant for equity valuation (Hail, 2013).  
Value-relevance studies (see e.g., Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper, 2004; Francis and 
Schipper 1999) test for a correlation between accounting numbers and measures of market 
value.  An accounting amount that has a significant association with share prices indicates 
that the information is relevant and reliable enough to be of value to investors.  
Value relevance can be operationalised in various ways (Francis and Schipper, 1999; 
Hail, 2012).  In this paper we use an earnings and book value relation with market value. An 
incremental value relevance test (Hung and Subramanyam, 2007) is used to examine the 
additional information that NGE earnings provide above and beyond that provided by NPAT 
reported under NZ GAAP as shown in (3) below. All variables are scaled by the number of 
shares. 
  ttNZGAAPttNZGAAPtt BVNPATNGENPATMV   3210  (3) 
Where: 
MVt = market capitalisation at balance date  
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NZGAAP
tNPAT  = net profit after tax under NZ GAAP. 
NZGAAP
tt NPATNGE  = the difference between the non- GAAP earnings and net profit after 
tax under NZGAAP. 
tBV  = book value of equity under NZGAAP 
it = error term  
The value relevance test is repeated using analysts’ forecasts of earnings rather than the 
market valuation which reflects information other than earnings (Dechow, Ge and Schrand, 
2010).  
 
5.0 Descriptive Information 
5.1 Companies reporting adjusted profit figures  
The distribution of NGE reporting from 2004 to 2012 inclusive is given in Table 2. 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
Panel A of Table 2 shows that there are 104 cases of NGE being reported over the 
nine year period. The number of companies reporting NGE is low in 2004 and 2005, but 
begins to climb from 2006 with a significant increase from 2007.  Five per cent of companies 
report NGE in 2004 compared to 26 per cent in 2012, with the peak in 2011.3  
Companies reporting adjustments in 2010 and 2011 were affected by New Zealand 
tax changes which included a drop in the company tax rate from 33% to 30% and 
depreciation on buildings with useful lives of over 50 years no longer deductible for tax 
purposes (resulting in large deferred tax adjustments). The effects of these changes can be 
                                                     
3 These percentages are lower than those reported by the Deloitte survey (2011) because the focus of 
this study is on non-GAAP earnings reported in place of the audited NPAT figure, or statutory profit. 
The Deloitte survey includes all alternative profit figures reported such as EBIT and EBITDA, which 
are commonly used by companies to report on operations. However, the findings of this study support 
those of the Deloitte survey (2011). 
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seen in Panel B of Table 2 which reports the number of NGE adjustments distinguishing 
between tax-related and non-tax related adjustments. Despite the large numbers of tax-related 
adjustments in 2010 and 2011, the number of non-related adjustments remains high. 
Additionally, the average number of adjustments per company remains high from 2008 to 
2012, although there is a drop in 2012. 
Table 3 gives a breakdown of the type of adjustments that were noted by companies 
in disclosing the differences in a NGE from reported NPAT.  
 
Insert Table 3 
 
The highest number of adjustments was in 2011 (46), with 2010 showing the peak in 
tax-related adjustments (15). The adjustments recorded most frequently were changes in fair 
value in financial instruments and investment properties. These adjustments became more 
prevalent after the introduction of IFRS. Adjustments for impairment of assets and goodwill 
were also frequent with the highest number in 2009, dropping back in 2010 and 2011, 
consistent with impairment as a consequence of the GFC. Restructuring adjustments were 
also highest over this time period.  In some instances no explanation was given as to the type 
of adjustments made and so this table includes an ‘unexplained’ category. 
 
5.2 NGE compared to NPAT 
Table 4 tests for differences on means and medians between NPAT and NGE on an 
annual basis.  
Insert Table 4 
 
This testing indicates that significant differences occurred only in 2009 and 2010, 
possibly because of the impact of the global financial crisis in those years. 
Table 5 provides the frequency and percentage of NGE figures that are higher than 
the corresponding statutory NPAT figures.  
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Insert Table 5 
 
Fifty-two of the 104 NGE figures (50 per cent) are higher than the corresponding 
NPAT figures, with the greatest number of instances occurring in the period from 2009 to 
2011.  Apart from 2008, in the post-IFRS period the NGE represented an increase on the 
NPAT figure in more than half the companies. This dropped back in 2012 and might well 
have been influenced with the FMA’s pending guidance on NGE reporting. So while there 
might be some argument for the manipulation hypothesis, this is not clear-cut. 
 
6.0 Hypotheses Results 
6.1 NGE and IFRs Reporting Regime 
Table 6 categorises companies reporting NGE relative to the number of years a 
company has been reporting pre- and post-IFRS adoption. 
 
Insert Table 6 
 
Table 6 shows an increase in the numbers of NGE reporting companies from one year 
to three years (+1 to +3) post-IFRS adoption. In years 4 to 6 there is a drop back but despite 
this it indicates that NGE reporting was low prior to the introduction of IFRS and since then it 
has continued at a much higher level beyond what might be considered the ‘settling in’ period 
for IFRS. 
Table 7 reports the results of tests on the means and medians of NGE and NPAT for 
periods prior to, at and post IFRS adoption. 
 
Insert Table 7 
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The tests are conducted on both actual value ($million) and scaled values and use t-
tests for means and Wilcoxon tests for medians. The results indicate that prior to IFRS 
adoption there was no significant difference in NGE and NPAT. However the post-IFRS 
adoption period does indicate significant difference.  
The result of the logistic model as described in section 4.2 testing the association 
between the disclosure of NGE and reporting under IFRS are presented in Tables 8 and 9. 
  
Insert Table 8  
 
The Pearson correlations reported in Table 8 show that NGE is significant and 
positively correlated with the reporting regime (REPREG), and the GFC.  
Table 9 reports four variations of the logistic model.  
 
Insert Table 9  
 
Model 1 includes all variables except for the global financial crisis time period and 
reporting regime (whether or not the company is reporting under IFRS) whereas Model 2 
includes the reporting regime variable (REPREG). Model 3 then excludes REPREG but 
introduces the global financial crisis variable (GFC) and Model 4 incorporates all the 
variables. 
The models are significant and the pseudo R2 increase with the inclusion of the 
reporting regime variable (REPREG) from 10.1 per cent in Model 1 to 19 per cent in Model 
2, and then from 15.7 per cent in Model 3 to 20 percent  in Model 4.   
All models show NGE being significantly positively associated with leverage (LEV). 
This confirms prior research findings that firms with higher leverage are more likely to 
disclose NGE (Hodgson and Stevenson-Clarke, 2000; Bhattacharya et al., 2004; Lougee and 
Marquardt, 2004; Bowen et al., 2005).  Additionally all models have a negative relationship 
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between NGE disclosure and change in share price indicating that where share price has 
dropped NGE is more likely to be used. Models 2, 3 and 4 have a negative relationship 
between NGE disclosure and loss, surprisingly indicating that companies reporting NGEs are 
less likely to be loss-making. 
In both Models 2 and 4 the coefficient for the test variable REPREG is positive and 
significant at the 0.01 level.  The results support Hypothesis 1 which predicts a significant 
association between the use of NGE and reporting under IFRS.  
When the GFC variable is introduced in Model 3 the coefficient is significant when 
IFRS adoption is not included in the model (Model 3), but disappears when IFRS adoption is 
introduced in Model 4. This could indicate that the GFC contributes to the NGE reporting.  
 
6.2 NGE and Earnings Persistence  
Table 10 examines earnings persistence.  
 
Insert Table 10 
 
The comparative models here show that the coefficient for NGEs is greater than that 
for NPATs, indicating that there is a more persistent earnings stream in the NGEs than in 
NPAT.  This would indicate support for Hypothesis 2 and that NGEs do provide a better 
measure of future earnings than NPAT. 
 
6.3 NGE and Value Relevance 
Table 11 examines value relevance of the difference between NGE and NPAT.  
 
Insert Table 11 
 
This change is not significant with respect to market value, but does appear to be 
significant with respect to analyst forecasts, indicating that the additional information 
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provided by the NGEs adds value to those forecasts.  So Hypothesis 3, stating that NGE 
measures provide more value relevance information than NPAT earnings is supported with 
respect to analyst forecasts but not with respect to investors. 
 
7.0 Conclusion  
There are two competing reasons for the disclosure of alternative profit measures: 
either that managers provide additional information they believe is relevant to users (the 
signalling hypothesis) or that they seek to emphasise aspects of performance to investors 
which reflect well on management (the manipulation hypothesis).  Past research on testing the 
signalling and manipulation hypotheses has been concentrated on the US capital market and 
has provided mixed evidence. Research in other jurisdictions with different sizes of capital 
market can contribute to the existing literature.  
This study investigates the reporting of NGE in company annual reports for a sample 
of New Zealand listed companies that adopted IFRS. Our research found that there is an 
increasing trend over the nine-year period in the number of companies reporting NGE: 
increasing from five per cent in 2004 to 26 per cent in 2012 with a peak of 34 per cent in 
2011. Multivariate analysis confirms that the disclosure of NGE is positively associated with 
the adoption of IFRS, i.e. that this increase is likely to be due, in part at least, to the 
introduction of IFRS. The impact of IFRS adoption provides an opportunity to test the two 
alternative explanations. 
The results indicate that while there is some decline in the number of companies 
reporting NGEs in the post-IFRS period, the numbers reporting are still a lot higher than in 
the pre-IFRS period.  Additionally, fifty per cent of NGE figures reported are higher than the 
corresponding NPAT figures.  However, there is no evidence to suggest that this is to 
manipulate results.  
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Our results indicate that NGE is a better predictor of future earnings and that they are 
value relevant for analysts. These findings support NGE being used to provide more 
information to the market.  
This study encompasses a period when there was a significant change in financial 
reporting and an economic crisis. It would be interesting to investigate the trend of NGE 
reporting once the effects of the GFC abate and the guidelines introduced by the FMA come 
into effect. 
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Tables 
Table 1 - Sample selection 
NZX All Index companies 106 
Less Property trusts  -5 
Less companies with incomplete data from 2004-2012 -34 
Less companies with 31 Dec 2012 balance dates which have not yet reported -9 
Total  58 
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Table 2 – Frequency of reporting 
Panel A - Frequency of companies reporting non-GAAP earnings (NGE)  
Year  
Total 
companies 
Companies reporting NGE 
Number 
Percentage 
of total companies 
2012 58 15 25.9% 
2011 58 20* 34.5% 
2010 58 19* 32.8% 
2009 58 17 29.3% 
2008 58 12 20.7% 
2007 58 9 15.5% 
2006 58 6 10.3% 
2005 58 3 5.2% 
2004 58 3 5.2% 
Overall 522 104 19.9% 
   * Included two and six companies that only had tax-related 
adjustments in 2011 and 2010, respectively 
 
Panel B - Frequency of total profit adjustments made by NGE reporting companies  
Year  
Total  
adjustments 
Non-tax related Tax-related 
Total adjustments 
 per company 
2012 26 21 5 1.73 
2011 47 34 13 2.35 
2010 37 22 15 2.06 
2009 37 32 5 2.18 
2008 26 21 5 1.86 
2007 13 11 2 1.30 
2006 6 6 0 0.86 
2005 4 4 0 1.33 
2004 3 3 0 1.00 
Overall 199 155 45 1.91 
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Table 3 - Adjustment categories by year  
  *Some companies may have more than one adjustment so totals are larger than number of companies 
 
Year  
2012 
n=15 
2011 
n=20 
2010 
n=19 
2009 
n=17 
2008 
n=12 
2007 
n=9 
2006 
n=6 
2005 
n=3 
2004 
n=3 
Total 
Fair value adjustments:            
Financial instruments 5 6 2 4 3 1 1 1 0 23 
Investment property/property for 
sale 
2 2 3 4 2 0 0 0 0 13 
Gains and losses on:            
Sales of assets 2 4 3 3 5 2 2 0 0 21 
Impairment of:           
Assets 1 4 3 6 0 0 1 0 1 16 
Goodwill 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 5 
One-off items before tax 2 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 6 
Other adjustments 2 3 3 4 3 1 1 1 1 19 
Unexplained 5 4 3 4 3 2 1 0 0 22 
Provision adjustments 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Reconciling adjustments 0 5 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 10 
Restructuring /relocation/redundancy 
costs 
2 3 3 5 2 2 0 0 0 17 
Sub-total 21 34 22 32 21 11 6 4 3 154 
Tax related adjustments 5 13 15 5 5 2 0 0 0 45 
TOTAL 26 46 37 37 26 13 6 4 3 199 
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Table 4: Tests on differences between NPAT and NGE by year  
  $ million  Scaled by number of shares 
Year n Test on means 
t-stat 
(p-value) 
Test on medians 
Z-stat 
(p-value) 
 Test on means 
t-stat 
(p-value) 
Test on medians 
Z-stat 
(p-value) 
      
2012 15 -0.344 
(0.736) 
-0.734 
(0.463) 
0.338 
(0.741) 
-0.524 
(0.600) 
2011 20 -1.382 
(0.183) 
-1.720 
(0.085) 
-1.657 
(0.114) 
-1.504 
(0.133) 
2010 19 -2.174* 
(0.043) 
-2.482* 
(0.013) 
-2.691* 
(0.015) 
-2.844** 
(0.004) 
2009 17 -1.922 
(0.073) 
-2.411* 
(0.016) 
 -1.992 
(0.064) 
-2.481* 
(0.013) 
2008 12 1.903 
(0.084) 
-1.955 
(0.051) 
 1.246 
(0.239) 
-1.955 
(0.051) 
2007  9 0.560 
(0.591) 
-0.338 
(0.735) 
 -0.339 
(0.743) 
-0.507 
(0.612) 
2006  6 -0.525 
(0.622) 
-0.944 
(0.345) 
 -1.298 
(0.251) 
-1.214 
(0.225) 
2005  3 -1.252 
(0.337) 
-1.604 
(0.109) 
 1.629 
(0.245) 
-1.604 
(0.109) 
2004  3 -0.979 
(0.431) 
-0.535 
(0.593) 
 -0.867 
(0.477) 
-0.447 
(0.655) 
* and ** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels where the level of significance is two-tailed  
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Table 5 – Comparison of non-GAAP earnings and Net Profit After Tax (NPAT) 
 
Year  
Total NGE 
reporting  
companies 
NGE greater than 
NPAT 
Number Percentage  
2012 15 6 40.0% 
2011 20 11 55.0% 
2010 19 12 63.2% 
2009 17 10 58.8% 
2008 12 1 8.3% 
2007 9 4 44.4% 
2006 6 4 66.7% 
2005 3 2 66.7% 
2004 3 2 66.7% 
Overall 104 52 50.0% 
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Table 6 –Frequency of NGE reporting companies for years before and after IFRS adoption  
 
 Reporting years before (-) and after (+) IFRS adoption for individual companies 
Number -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 
Total companies 
 
29 41 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 29 17 
NGE reporting companies 
 
1 3 5 5 14 15 15 20 17 6 3 
Percentage  
NGE reporting companies 
/Total companies  
3% 7% 9% 9% 24% 26% 26% 34% 29% 21% 18% 
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Table 7 - Tests on differences between NPAT and NGE before, at and after IFRS adoption 
 
  $ million  Scaled by number of shares 
Year n Test on means 
t-stat 
(p-value) 
Test on medians 
Z-stat 
(p-value) 
 Test on means 
t-stat 
(p-value) 
Test on medians 
Z-stat 
(p-value) 
      
Before 
(-1 to -4) 
14 -1.453 
(0.170) 
-1.490 
(0.136) 
-0.981 
(0.344) 
-1.274 
(0.203) 
      
At Transition 
(0) 
14 1.940 
(0.074) 
-1.423 
(0.155) 
0.909 
(0.380) 
-0.445 
(0.656) 
       
After 
(1 to 6) 
76 -2.907 
(0.005)* 
-3.536 
(0.000)** 
 -3.607 
(0.001)** 
-3.680 
(0.000)** 
      
* and ** indicate significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels where the level of significance is two-tailed  
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Table 8 - Pearson correlations  
 
 
N
G
E 
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
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
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R
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R
IC
E 
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SS
 
G
FC
 
NGE 1.000         
REPREG 0.240*** 1.000        
MKTBK 0.010 0.028 1.000       
GROWTH -0.036 -0.089** 0.005 1.000      
LEV 0.075 0.035 -0.057* -0.002 1.000     
PROFIT -0.022 0.033 -0.008 -0.003 -0.025 1.000    
SHAREPRICE -0.068 -0.059 0.017 0.244** 0.018 -0.001 1.000   
LOSS -0.068 0.138*** 0.014 0.047 -0.227*** -0.022 0.048 1.000  
GFC 0.195*** 0.539*** -0.008 -0.049 -0.025 0.062 -0.079 0.0128** 1.000 
NGE Disclosure of non-GAAP earnings - Binary (Yes (1)/No (0) ) 
REPREG Reporting regime – Binary (IFRS (1) /Prior NZ GAAP (0)) 
MKTBK Market-to-book value of equity 
GROWTH Sales growth – percentage change from prior year 
LEV Leverage (Total liabilities/Total assets) 
PROFIT Percentage change in profit from prior year 
SHAREPRICE Percentage change in year end share price from prior year 
LOSS Loss-reported in current year – Binary (Yes (1)/No (0)) 
GFC Global financial crisis – Binary (Yes (1=2009-2011) / No (0=2012, 2004-2008)) 
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Table 9 - Logistic regression results for association with disclosure of Non-GAAP 
Earnings 
 
  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
Test Variable     
REPREG  1.574  1.307 
  (0.000)**  (0.000)** 
Control Variables     
MKTBK -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.946) (0.938) (0.994) (0.936) 
GROWTH -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.265) (0.261) (0.263) (0.263) 
LEV 0.754 0.924 0.942 0.996 
 (0.040)* (0.020)* (0.014)* (0.012)* 
PROFIT 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.128) (0.117) (0.115) (0.108) 
SHAREPRICE -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.010)* (0.048)* (0.016)* (0.042)* 
LOSS -0.599 -0.873 -0.870 -0.952 
 (0.116) (0.024)* (0.030)* (0.016)* 
GFC   1.061 0.505 
    (0.000)**  (0.055) 
IND (Industry dummies) Included Included Included Included 
Constant -2.244 -3.442 -2.737 -3.481 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
N 522 522 522 522 
Cox & Snell R2 0.064 0.121 0.100 0.127 
Nagelkerke R2 0.101 0.190 0.157 0.200 
     
* and ** highlight significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels where the level of significance is two-tailed 
REPREG Reporting regime – Binary (IFRS (1) /Prior NZ GAAP (0)) 
MKTBK Market-to-book value of equity 
GROWTH Sales growth – percentage change from prior year 
LEV Leverage (Total liabilities/Total assets) 
PROFIT Percentage change in profit from prior year 
SHAREPRICE Percentage change in year end share price from prior year 
LOSS Loss-reported in current year – Binary (Yes (1)/No (0)) 
GFC Global financial crisis – Binary (Yes (1=2009-2011) / No (0=2012, 2004-2008)) 
IND Industry indicator variables (Broad industry categorisation) 
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Table 10 – Earnings Persistence  
 
  
NPATt 
 
NPATt 
NGE(t-1) 0.521  
 (0.000)**  
NPAT(t-1)  0.474 
  (0.000)** 
Constant 0.063 0.076 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
N 272 272 
F-value 83.796 73.659 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Adjusted R2% 0.237 0.211 
   
* and ** highlight significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels where the level of significance is two-tailed 
NPAT(t) NZ GAAP earnings in current year scaled by no. of shares  
NPAT(t-1) NZ GAAP earnings in prior year scaled by no. of shares  
NGE(t-1) Non-GAAP earnings in prior year scaled by no. of shares  
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Table 11 – Value Relevance  
 
  
MV 
 
ANAFCST 
   
BV 2.421 0.011 
 (0.004)** (0.000)** 
NPAT 0.017 0.861 
 (0.998) (0.000)** 
(NGE – NPAT) 8.428 0.716 
 (0.581) (0.000)** 
Constant 0.071 0.006 
 (0.962) (0.438) 
   
N 272           270 
F-value 4.615 812.976 
 (0.004) (0.000) 
Adjusted R2% 0.039 0.901 
   
* and ** highlight significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels where the level of significance is two-tailed 
MV Market value at balance date scaled by no. of shares 
ANAFCST Analysts’ forecast of earnings closest to balance date scaled by no. of shares 
  
NPAT NZ GAAP earnings scaled by no. of shares  
NGE Non-GAAP earnings scaled by no. of shares  
(NGE – NPAT) Difference between NGE and NPAT scaled by no. of shares 
 
 
 
